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Summary. 
 
The basics of full reserve (FR) banking are set out below, 
followed by thirty eight flawed arguments against, and four 
flawed arguments for full reserve (also known as “100% 
reserve”). 
Each argument set out below has: 
1. A heading (which also appears in the table of contents 
below).  
2. Where the heading does not adequately capture the nature 
of the argument, there is a paragraph below the heading 
starting “I.e-”, which expands on the heading.  
3. There are references one or more economists who have put 
the relevant argument in almost every case. 
4. The answer to each argument which starts with a paragraph 
beginning with the word “Answer.” 
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Full reserve banking in brief. 
 
The term full reserve (FR) refers here to the system advocated 
by Friedman (1960, 2nd half of Ch3), Kotlikoff (2012, p.43) and 
Werner (2011) amongst others. That is system sometimes 
called “100% reserve banking” and which is as follows.  
The existing banking industry is split in two. One half offers 
depositors totally safe accounts (or accounts which are as near 
total safety as it is possible to get). In order to ensure that the 
money really is completely safe, nothing is done with the 
money: it is just lodged at the central bank. Though possibly (as 
advocated by Friedman) some of that money could be invested 
in short term government debt. That money thus earns little or 
no interest, but it is instant access. 
The second half of the industry lends to mortgagors, industry 
and so on. But that half of the industry is funded just by 
shareholders, or stakeholders who are in effect shareholders. 
For example under Kotlikoff’s system, both halves of the 
industry consist of mutual funds (“unit trusts” in the UK), with 
the first half consisting of money market mutual funds and the 
second half consisting of non-money market mutual funds. And 
those with a stake in non-money market mutual funds are in 
effect shareholders, thought they are not normally referred to 
as such. 
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As to Friedman’s system, there again, the entities making up 
one half of the former banking industry are separate from the 
entities making up the second half. In contrast, under Werner’s 
system, safe accounts and accounts which lend on account 
holders’ money are offered under the same roof. However, the 
basic principle of all three systems is the same. 
One advantage of FR is that no bank or bank like entity can 
suddenly fail in the same way as banks tend to suddenly fail 
under the existing system. Thus no taxpayer backing or 
subsidies are needed to underpin the system. However, any 
entity can decline SLOWLY given poor management. The 
reasons why sudden failure is ruled out are as follows. 
As to safe entities / accounts, the money there is near 
completely safe. And as to lending entities, if lending is done in 
an incompetent manner, all that happens is that the value of the 
relevant shares (or mutual fund units) falls: the actual entity 
does not become insolvent. 
As Selgin (1988) put it “For a balance sheet without debt 
liabilities, insolvency is ruled out-” 
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Flawed arguments against FR. 
1. FR limits the availability of credit.  
 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.21), Vickers (2011, para 
3.21.) and Kregel (2012). See Kregel’s passage starting, “In a 
narrow banking system..”. 
Answer. FR certainly limits the availability of credit in that it 
requires those who fund loans and investments to carry the risk 
involved (as opposed to the existing system where the taxpayer 
carries much of the ultimate risk). And that means the cost of 
funding loans and investments will rise a bit. But that rise in the 
cost of borrowing simply reflects the removal of a subsidy: 
that’s the current practice of letting people have their money 
loaned on or invested, with the taxpayer carrying the ultimate 
risk.  
As to the demand reducing effect of that reduced availability of 
credit, that is easily dealt with by standard stimulatory 
measures (the measure favoured by advocates of FR, at least 
Friedman (1960) and Werner (2011)) being to simply create 
new base money and spend it into the economy and/or cut  
taxes). 
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2. Safe account money is not invested under FR: a 
waste. 
I.e. as regards the safe accounts or safe entities that are set up 
under full reserve, that involves storing significant amounts of 
money which on the face of it could be used for loans and 
investments, and that is a waste. 
Claimed by Vickers (2011, section 3.21).  
Answer. When full reserve is implemented and £Xbn is lodged 
in safe accounts (which comes the same thing as people 
storing £Xbn under their mattresses), it costs nothing to supply 
the population with the sums that it wants to keep under those 
hypothetical mattresses. As Friedman (1960, Ch3) put it, “It 
need cost society essentially nothing in real resources to 
provide the individual with the current services of an additional 
dollar in cash balances.” 
That argument can be put the other way round and as follows. 
Assume FR has been implemented, and to keep things simple, 
let us assume that the economy is at capacity. And assume 
that the above money in safe accounts is then used to fund 
loans. That amounts to, or causes an increase in aggregate 
demand, and that’s not possible, assuming the economy is 
already at capacity. Thus to counteract that increase in 
demand, interest rates would have to rise. Thus the net effect 
would be no increase in lending. Thus the above claim by 
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Vickers that unused money in safe accounts is money that can 
be actually used does not stand inspection. 
3. Central bank money is not debt free. 
I.e. the claim by some advocates of FR that central bank 
money is “debt free” is false because all money is a form of 
debt.  
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.21). 
Answer. In a minor and near irrelevant sense the above “all 
money is debt” idea is right: that is, base money or central bank 
created money is NOMINALLY a debt owed by the central bank 
to the holder of that money. Indeed British £10 notes and other 
notes actually state “I promise to pay the bearer on demand the 
sum of £10”. 
But of course that “promise” is a farce. That is, anyone trying to 
get £10 of gold (or anything else) from the Bank of England in 
exchange for their £10 note, would be told to go away (perhaps 
assisted by the police). Thus in effect, central bank created 
money is indeed debt free. 
In contrast, for every dollar of money created by commercial 
banks there is, or so it seems, a dollar of debt (owed by a 
borrower to a commercial bank). But even that argument is 
debatable (See No.39 below). 
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It could be argued that base money is a debt in the following 
sense. A characteristic of a debt is that it can be used to nullify 
and equal and opposite debt. Thus when government suddenly 
demands $X of tax from you, you can use base money to pay 
them (in fact it’s the only money they will accept). Thus it could 
be argued that base money BECOMES a debt when you 
receive a tax demand. But that is not the normal meaning of the 
word “debt”.  
4. Bank capital is expensive for tax reasons. 
I.e. increasing bank capital as occurs when FR is implemented 
would involve a cost in that the tax treatment of equity is more 
onerous that in the case of deposits.  
Claimed by Elliot (2013) - a Brookings Institution paper. 
Answer. The above argument contains an extremely simple 
flaw, namely that tax is an ENTIRELY ARTIFICIAL imposition, 
and should thus be ignored. To illustrate, if government taxed 
red cars more heavily that blue cars, that would raise the price 
of red cars. But that would not be evidence that the REAL 
COST of producing red cars was any more than the cost of 
blue cars.  
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5. Central banks will still have to lend to commercial 
banks. 
I.e. to deal with any lack of availability of credit, the central bank 
may need to lend to commercial banks which exposes the 
central banks to risks. Thus FR does not dispose of risks for 
taxpayers. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013). See paragraph starting 
“Fourth, we consider-” (p.34).    
Answer. Possibly some FR advocates claim that central banks 
may need to lend to commercial banks, but most of them argue 
that new central bank money should only be spent into the 
economy when there is room for stimulus. As to lending, most 
FR advocates believe in leaving that and interest rates to the 
free market. That is, if demand for credit exceeds supply, most 
FR advocates believe in simply letting the price of credit rise.  
Moreover the logic used by the authorities in the recent crisis to 
justify assistance to banks is very debatable: that logic being 
that banks have made large losses, therefor they should be 
supplied with enough taxpayers’ money to enable them to get 
back to approximately where they were before the crisis.  
In any normal industry, the fact that losses are made is a good 
indication that the industry is too large and needs to contract. 
And as to the fact that if the total amount of lending declines if 
the banking industry declines which in turn reduces aggregate 
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demand, that is easily dealt with by standard stimulatory 
measures. 
Indeed, according to King (2010) the assets of banks in Britain 
are now TEN TIMES what they were relative to GDP in the 
1960s: additional evidence that the banking industry should be 
shrunk. 
Of course, assuming we continue with the existing banking 
system, giving banks enough assistance during a crisis to 
prevent a TOTAL COLLAPSE of an economy or the world 
economy is justified. But the recent trillion dollar bailout of 
banks is just additional evidence as to the flaws in the existing 
system: it’s not an argument for central banks to lend to 
commercial banks on a regular basis. 
Moreover, the lender of last resort facility available to 
commercial banks is just one of forms of preferential treatment 
(i.e. subsidy) enjoyed by commercial banks: other industries do 
not enjoy the same luxury. 
 6.  FR stops banks producing free money from thin 
air which can fund investments. 
I.e. when a private bank grants a loan, it can be argued that the 
relevant money comes out of thin air and that money can be 
used to fund investments. Thus (so it might seem) people do 
not really need to save in order to fund investments. 
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Claimed by Pettifor (2014) and Kregel (2012).  See Kregel’s 
passage where he claims that FR would create a system “in 
which all investment decisions-.” See Pettifor’s paragraph 
starting “Unlike commodity money-”. 
Answer. The idea that we don’t need to save in order to provide 
ourselves with investments (houses, office blocks, etc) is just 
too good to be true. And as the old saying goes, if anything 
seems to be too good to be true, it probably is. 
If an economy is at capacity and a bank grants a loan, the latter 
will raise demand unless someone abstains from spending (i.e. 
saves). And if the economy is at capacity and demand rises, 
then inflation rises. As a result the central bank will raise 
interest rates, which cuts lending, borrowing and demand. Thus 
the net effect is zero: back to square one. Thus the idea that 
commercial banks can create money or wealth out of thin air 
which enables someone to make real investments is a myth. 
The latter “zero effect” obviously plays out slightly differently 
depending on EXACTLY HOW the authorities counteract the 
above increase in demand (e.g. they could counteract it with a 
fiscal tightening up). Plus the zero effect would play out 
differently depending on whether the country was on the gold 
standard or not. But certainly the idea that we can enjoy the 
benefits of new investments without having to save or abstain 
from consumption to fund those investments is nonsense. 
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7.  Investments under FR might not be viable. 
Claimed by Kregel (2012). See his passage starting “First, the 
real investments chosen-.” 
Answer. The advocates of FR do not claim that investors will be 
any more competent under FR than under the existing system. 
Clearly under both systems there are, or will be competent and 
incompetent investors. 
8. FR will not reduce pleas by failing industries to be 
rescued by government. 
Claimed by Kregel (2012). See his passage starting “There 
would always be a risk-” 
Answer. Advocates of FR do not claim that FR is a solution to 
corruption: in particular, politically well-connected individuals 
trying to extract taxpayers’ money from politicians. 
9. The cost of converting to FR will be high.  
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.21 and by Warner (2014). 
Answer. Assuming a country benefits from FR and continues to 
benefit for the next century or two, then transition costs are 
probably near irrelevant compared to the long term benefits. 
Moreover, as one advocate of FR (Friedman Ch3(1960)) put it 
“There is no technical problem of achieving a transition from 
our present system to 100% reserves easily , fairly speedily, 
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and without serious repercussions on financial or economic 
markets”. 
10. Central bank committees won’t be politically 
neutral.  
I.e. FR involves some committee of economists (and perhaps 
others) deciding on how much money to create and spend, or 
deciding on other forms of stimulus, and there is no guarantee 
such a committee will be independent or politically neutral. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.22) and by Pettifor (2014). 
See Pettifor’s paragraph starting “Wolf’s proposal is 
problematic-.”. 
Answer. There is no reason why this should be any more or 
less of a problem than with EXISTING committees that 
determine stimulus. For example there is the Bank of England 
Monetary Policy Committee which has a HUGE INFLUENCE 
on stimulus (via interest rate adjustments, quantitative easing, 
etc). Other countries obviously have similar committees. And 
those committees most certainly do not interfere with strictly 
political decisions, like how much the country should spend on 
health or education, or what proportion of GDP should be taken 
by public spending. 
Moreover, Dyson (2013) (and doubtless other advocates of full 
reserve) are VERY SPECIFIC on the point that the above sort 
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of committee should UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES interfere 
with political decisions. The exact way this is done under 
Dyson’s system is for the “committee” to decide HOW MUCH 
money should be net spent into the economy over the next six 
months (or some other period of time), while the EXACT WAY 
that money is spend (or whether the adjustment to net 
spending comes in the form of adjustments to tax) is left 
ENTIRELY to politicians and voters. 
Also, the form of stimulus advocated by most supporters of FR 
(i.e. creating new base money and spending it and/or cutting 
taxes) comes to exactly the same thing as a form of stimulus 
that has been applied in very large doses over the last two or 
three years: that is fiscal stimulus followed by quantitative 
easing. Thus if political interference by the above sort of 
committee is inevitable under full reserve, one has to wonder 
how those sort of committees have managed to avoid 
interfering in politics to any significant extent over the last few 
years. 
11. Administration costs of FR would be high. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2014) and Krugman (2014). See 
Krugman’s paragraph starting “Cochrane’s proposal calls 
for-”. 
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Answer. Obviously the central bank or some other body of bank 
regulators would have to do a fair amount of auditing of 
commercial banks to make sure they were obeying the rules. 
But such auditing is necessary under the EXISTING SYSTEM. 
Moreover, compare that with the rules which make up the 
Dodd-Frank regulations: those stand at 10,000 pages and 
counting. And then there is the near incoherent ring-fence 
proposals put by Vickers (2011). Compared to those two, FR is 
simplicity itself. 
For a scathing indictment of Vickers, see Kotlikoff (2012). As to 
Dodd-Frank, the head of the Dallas Fed (Fisher (2013) said 
“We contend that Dodd–Frank has not done enough to corral 
“too big to fail banks” and that, on balance, the act has made 
things worse, not better.” And for two more criticisms of current 
attempts at bank reform see Schiller (2014) and Brown (2013). 
12. The cost of current accounts will rise under FR.  
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.22) and Aziz (2014).  
Answer. It is true that under FR, those with transaction / safe / 
current / checking accounts get little or no interest: i.e. probably 
less interest than on such accounts under the existing system. 
However interest under the existing system only comes as a 
result of being able to have one’s money loaned on or invested 
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with the taxpayer carrying the ultimate risk. But the latter is a 
totally unwarranted “have your cake and eat it” subsidy. 
If restaurants had been subsidised for the last century and that 
subsidy was removed, then (to use Van Dixhoorn’s phrase) 
“losses would be imposed on” those eating at restaurants. But 
that would not justify continuing to subsidise restaurants. 
A possible solution to the above problem would be to allow 
bank customers to do debit card transactions or draw cheques 
on investment accounts (that’s accounts which fund loans to 
mortgagors, businesses, etc). That would be the equivalent of 
telling your bank under the existing system keep the balance in  
your current or checking account to a minimum: i.e. telling them 
to put any surplus funds into a term or deposit account. 
However banks would charge for that service, thus costs for 
customers would probably not be reduced: probably one of the 
reasons why that sort of service is not normally available from 
banks under the existing system. 
13. FR is dependent on demand injections. 
Claimed by Kregel (2012). 
Answer. One wonders how Kregel would describe the trillion 
dollars recently used to bail out the bank industry and the large 
amounts of stimulus needed to rectify the effects of the recent 
crisis. Kregel uses the phrase “chronically dependent on 
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demand injections”. The phrase “chronically dependent” would 
seem more appropriate to the existing banking system, rather 
than to FR. 
Moreover, stimulus costs nothing in real terms: to put it 
figuratively, printing and spending dollar bills (and/or cutting 
taxes) costs nothing. (See the quote from Friedman in No.2 
above). 
14. The effect of FR on inflation and unemployment 
is unclear.  
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013). As Van Dixhoorn put it: “it 
would be difficult to predict what the ultimate effects on output 
and inflation would be..”. 
Answer. There is NO NEED WHATEVER to predict what the 
effect on output or inflation would be because the latter two can 
be adjusted (just as they are under the existing system) by 
adjusting stimulus. That of course is done under the existing 
system by adjusting interest rates, quantitative easing, the size 
of the deficit, etc. In contrast, most advocates of FR advocate a 
slightly different form of stimulus (which actually amounts to 
fiscal stimulus plus QE). But that’s a minor technical point. 
Moreover, under the EXISTING SYSTEM, governments have 
only the haziest ideas as to what inflation and unemployment 
will be five years from now: e.g. there might be another credit 
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crunch, or there might not. Thus the above criticism applies to 
the EXISTING SYSTEM as much as it does to FR. 
15. The state cannot be trusted with peoples’ 
money. 
I.e. the so called “safe accounts” set up under FR are not 
entirely safe. 
Claimed by (Van Dixhoorn (2013) section VIII, p.32. 
Answer. Clearly governments are not entirely reliable and for 
two reasons. First, governments may cause excess inflation, 
which means that sums deposited in safe accounts lose their 
value, and second, governments have been known to renege 
on promises to return sums they have borrowed or which have 
been lodged with them. However, neither of those two points 
stands inspection. 
As to inflation, if money lodged at the central bank is losing its 
value, then money lodged at a private bank will lose value at 
exactly the same rate. 
And as to the point that governments can renege on promises 
to return monies lodged with them, the sort of government 
which does that is quite likely to also confiscate monies lodged 
at private banks. 
Moreover, FR is a system suitable for a country with a 
reasonably responsible government. Obviously where 
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government is near non-existent or chaotic, citizens would be 
well advised to keep their savings under their mattress and/or 
in the form of valuables like some rare metal. 
And finally, under the existing system, millions of UK citizens 
seem to be happy to lodge a portion of their money with 
National Savings and Investments, a state run savings bank. 
That is, the reality is that a large proportion of the population in 
Britain regard government as being responsible enough to be 
entrusted with a portion of their wealth. 
16. FR will reduce innovation by banks.   
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013). Van Dixhoorn’s actual words 
are: “will reduce the amount of innovation in the payments 
system”. 
Answer. Under the EXISTING SYSTEM, commercial banks 
introduced debit and credit cards because those cards are 
more efficient for many transactions than cash or cheques. Any 
bank that had ignored those innovations would have lost 
customers. And exactly the same would apply under FR. That 
is, under FR, commercial banks would open current / checking / 
safe accounts for customers. And as to the EXACT WAY in 
which payments are made, that would be up to individual 
banks. And competitive forces would induce banks to adopt any 
sort of new technology (e.g. payment by mobile phones) just as 
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those forces induce them to adopt new technology under the 
existing system. 
17.  Lenders will try to turn their liabilities into “near-
monies”.  
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013) p.33. 
Answer. Obviously some lenders will try to do that. In fact 
advocates of FR in the 1930s were well aware of that potential 
problem as are present day advocates of FR, Dyson (2013) in 
particular. 
But dealing with that problem is not difficult. For example it 
would be easy to require that all literature and web sites dealing 
with non-money market mutual funds under Kotlikoff’s FR 
system to declared in bold type something to the effect that 
“You are not guaranteed  $X back for every $X you invest in 
this fund.” In fact legislation in the UK actually requires those 
selling unit trusts and other stock exchange investments to 
declare something very similar: a sentence to the effect that 
“the value of these investments can fall as well as rise”. 
Moreover, one has to wonder why those selling mutual fund 
units (“unit trusts” in the UK) seem to make NO EFFORT 
whatever to portray their liabilities as money (apart from money 
market mutual funds of course).  A possible answer to that is 
that the existing system supplies the economy with as much 
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money as it needs, so there is no inducement for non money 
market mutual funds do the latter. Nevertheless, as Van 
Dixhoorn rightly points out, portraying one’s liabilities as money 
gives those liabilities an added attraction. But it is striking there 
seem to be no attempts by non money market mutual funds / 
unit trusts to pull that trick under the existing system. 
18. Anyone can create money, thus trying to limit 
money creation is futile.  
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013) - paragraph starting “The 
sector will-” p.34). 
Answer. The definition of the word money is something like 
“anything widely accepted in payment for goods and services”. 
Now the liabilities of banks are “widely accepted” because they 
are SPECIFICALLY DISIGNED to be easily transferrable. In 
contrast, it is quite untrue to suggest, as Van Dixhoorn does 
that an ordinary trade credit is a form of money. To illustrate, if 
firm A delivers goods to firm B worth $X, B is then indebted to A 
to the tune of $X. And B could issue an IOU in payment. But is 
that liability (the IOU) likely to be of any use to A for the 
purposes of “paying money” to some third party? It is unlikely. 
Thus an ordinary trade credit just isn't money in a large majority 
of cases. 
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The latter form of “IOU” money creation was much more 
common in the 1700s and 1800s: the IOUs took the form of 
bills of exchange. But those are rare nowadays. 
But that is not to say that after implementing FR there would be 
a total absence of types of money other than what the average 
household or firm regards as money: what might be called 
“official” money. In particular, in the world’s financial centres 
various types of debt serve the purpose of money: e.g. short 
term government debt. However for about 95% of households 
and the large majority of firms, particularly small and medium 
size ones, there is only one form of money and that is central 
bank created money and money created by well known 
commercial bank which trades at par with central bank money. 
19. Advocates of FR are concerned just with retail 
banking. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, paragraph starting “Third the 
critics have..” p.34 and Krugman (2014).  
Answer. If advocates of FR really were concerned just with 
retail banks clearly that would be a serious fault given that the 
recent crisis in the US was largely a run on shadow banks. 
However, any idea that retail banks were not part of the 
problem is wide of the mark: there was a run on the UK bank 
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Northern Rock during the recent crisis, and that was (and still 
is) an exclusively retail operation. 
But in any case, advocates of FR are not concerned PURELY 
with retail banking (at least they certainly shouldn’t be). That is, 
there is a FUNDAMENTAL principle involved here which is that 
ANY ENTITY above a certain size that attracts funds and lends 
them on or invests them should abide by. It’s as follows. 
To promise someone you’ll return $X to them while investing or 
lending on their money is basically fraudulent because it’s a 
near certainty that sooner or later the loans or investments go 
wrong, and you won’t be able to return the $X. Indeed the fact 
is that throughout history banks have gone bust regular as 
clockwork. 
Banning the latter fraud is an important element in FR, and it 
makes no difference what sort of bank is concerned: 
investment bank, shadow bank, etc. Nor does it matter whether 
the relevant entity sees itself or portrays itself as a bank. The 
above “anti-fraud” principle should apply to all lending / 
investing entities. At least it should certainly apply to all such 
entities above some given size. (That is because harmful 
systemic effects tend not to come from the smallest banks or 
“lending entities”). 
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20. The government and/or central bank will not be 
better than the market at regulating the amount of 
money.  
Claimed by Warner (2014) passage starting “..it takes quite a 
leap to think..”. 
Answer. We have just been thru a crisis caused by a 
catastrophic failure of private banks to regulate the amount of 
money / loans in a stable manner. Thus the above alleged 
weakness in FR flies in the face of reality. 
Moreover, most of those who make the above criticism seem 
quite happy for government and central bank to regulate 
aggregate demand (e.g. by regulating interest rates). And that 
regulation is necessary PRECISELY BECAUSE the free market 
produces booms and busts.  
Of course governments’ and central banks’ efforts to tone down 
booms and busts are nowhere near 100% competent. But, the 
people who make the above criticism clearly think that the latter 
efforts are better than nothing. 
An even more glaring self-contradiction inherent to the above 
criticism is that the FORM OF stimulus effected over the last 
two or three years (fiscal stimulus followed by QE) comes to 
EXACTLY THE SAME THING as the form of stimulus 
advocated by most FR advocates. 
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21. FR would drive business to unregulated sector. 
Claimed by Krugman (2014) passage starting “If we impose 
100% reserve..” and by Diamond (1986). 
Answer. Clearly if government regulates just one part of an 
industry, that will cause a number of operators to flee to the 
unregulated sector. And that has indeed happened over the last 
decade. That is, there has been a shift of business away from 
official banks and into the shadow bank sector. But the simple 
solution to that is to regulate any entity above a certain size that 
amounts to a bank. 
As the former head of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, 
Turner (2012) put it: "If it looks like a bank and quacks like a 
bank, it has got to be subject to bank-like safe-guards." 
22. It wasn’t just banks that went wrong in 2008: 
also households became over-indebted.  
Claimed by Krugman (2014). 
Answer. So who were those households indebted to? It was 
banks (or those who banks had sold mortgage backed 
securities to). It was banks who sold those “No Income No Job 
or Assets” mortgages. 
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23. Creation of liquidity / money is prevented.  
Claimed by Diamond (1986).  
Answer. True, but that is the whole object of the exercise. That 
is advocates of FR claim that just the central bank should 
create money, while commercial banks continue to act as 
intermediaries between borrowers and lenders much as they do 
at present (with the exception that lenders carry all losses when 
poor loans are made rather than the taxpayer carrying those 
losses as occurs at present).  
Put another way, central banks (cenbanks) can and do create 
money / liquidity just as much as commercial banks 
(combanks). Thus the important question is: should we have 
just the cenbank doing it, or cenbanks plus combanks or just 
combanks? Given that we already give cenbanks the job of 
countering the instabilities created by the free market (including 
combank money creation), why not just go the whole way and 
have just cenbanks doing the job? 
Having both type of bank do the job is similar to allowing your 
child access to the steering wheel of a car: you can no doubt 
counteract any silly moves the child makes (the equivalent of   
cenbanks countering the “silly moves” of combanks), but it’s 
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simpler just to bar children / combanks any access to the 
controls. 
24. Funding via commercial paper would be more 
difficult under FR.  
Claimed by Diamond (1986). 
Answer. Loans based on commercial paper are just one form of 
loan. The important question is to work out what is the best 
banking / lending / borrowing system for ALL TYPES OF 
LENDER AND BORROWER.  
25. FR is nearly the same as monetarism.  
Claimed by Pettifor (2014).  
Answer. It is true that advocates of FR (just like the advocates 
of Modern Monetary Theory) claim that the size of the stock of 
base money (or more generally “Private sector net financial 
assets” to use MMT parlance) influences demand. To that 
extent, both groups have something in common with 
monetarists. 
However, advocates of FR (like the majority of economists 
probably) also claim that THE PROCESS OF spending extra 
money into the economy also has an effect. I.e. they claim 
fiscal boost has an effect. That is if government decides to hire 
an extra thousand employees by this time next month and pay 
for that with new money, then employment goes up by a 
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thousand, all else equal (assuming the extra money is not 
inflationary, i.e. assuming the economy was below capacity 
before the extra thousand were hired). And that all happens 
despite there being no “monetary” effect  (at least initially). That 
is, during the first few months of the above thousand 
employees work, there is a negligible increase in the money 
supply. 
26. Deposit insurance and lender of last resort 
solves existing banking problems. 
I.e. there is no need for FR. 
(Claimed by Aziz (2014)).   
Answer. Lender of last resort (a luxury not available to other 
industries) is a SUBSIDY of the banking industry. Same goes 
for deposit insurance where that is funded by taxpayers. And 
then there’s the trillion dollar bailout of the banking industry 
which has taken place over the last five years and the Too Big 
to Fail Subsidy.  
As it explains in the introductory economics text books, 
subsidies misallocate resources, that is, they reduce GDP 
(unless some very good social justifications can be found for 
the subsidies.) 
Incidentally, and contrary to common perception, Walter 
Bagehot did not approve of lender of last resort (Bagehot 
30 
 
(1873), final chapter). He regarded it as something that was so 
ingrained in the system that it would be impossible to remove. 
27. There is no demand for safe or warehouse 
banks. 
I.e. there has been no demand for throughout history for banks 
which simply lodge money without lending it on and thus 
earning depositors some interest. Thus there would be no 
demand for the safe accounts under FR. 
Claimed by White (2003) and Van Dixhoorn (2013). 
Answer. First, the above contradicts the equally common claim 
by opponents of FR that there’d be a stampede for safe 
accounts. See No.28 below. 
Second, the claim flies in the face of the facts. That is, most 
people want to spread their risks: e.g. store some of their 
wealth (liquid and illiquid) in very safe forms, while doing 
something more daring or risky with another portion of their 
wealth. And in fact there are numerous very safe types of bank 
or quasi-bank: there is National Savings and Investments in the 
UK and money market mutual funds in the US.  
It is true that the latter don’t pay a ZERO rate of interest, but the 
rate paid is very low, reflecting the safe nature of investments 
made. Thus there would presumably be a finite demand for an 
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account which involved even greater safety and paid an even 
lower rate. 
Moreover, to the extent that there IS A LIMITED demand for 
warehouse banking since WWII, that is hardly surprising. 
Reason is that taxpayer funded backing for conventional banks 
enables ordinary depositors to enjoy total safety while getting 
interest. Why go for an account that pays no interest when you 
can get interest gratis the taxpayer?  
28. FR would cause a stampede to safe accounts. 
I.e. few existing depositors would want their stake in their bank 
to be effectively converted to a shareholding. 
Claimed by Dowd (2014). 
Answer. The reality is that shareholders (in corporations in 
general rather than specifically in banks) do not demand a 
particularly high rate of return compared to depositors or bond-
holders. 
Moreover, the above claim by Dowd contradicts the claim made 
by several opponents of FR, namely that there’d be no demand 
for safe accounts  - see No.27 above. 
29. FR would raise the cost of funding banks. 
I.e. it might seem that the cost of funding banks rises because 
shareholders demand a bigger return on their investment than 
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depositors. Thus if the proportion of bank funding that comes 
from shares as opposed to deposits is increased then the cost 
of funding banks would seem to rise. 
Answer. The flaw in the above argument was set out by  
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller. As they pointed out, the 
risks involved in running a bank which performs a given set of 
activities is a GIVEN. Thus the price charged by those covering 
the risk involved is also a given. Thus increasing the number of 
people who cover that risk has no effect on the total charge 
they make for covering the risk. 
30. Fractional reserve is not fraudulent. 
I.e. Fractional reserve (that is the existing banking system) has 
been going for centuries and is not widely perceived as 
fraudulent.  
Claimed by White (2003). 
Answer. The first problem there is that White in the latter work 
doesn’t say what the alleged fraud actually is. Instead, he refers 
readers on his first page to about ten books and articles which 
apparently set out the fraud. It is thus impossible to know what 
fraud or alleged fraud White refers to. 
Second, given the number of works he cites that apparently set  
out the fraud, it’s unlikely those works all agree with each other. 
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Indeed, there are several popular “fraud” charges made against 
fractional reserve which are clearly invalid. 
It’s thus near impossible to deal with his claim that for fraud to 
exist, someone must be duped. Reason is that there are all 
degrees of “duping” from slight misrepresentation to serious 
and carefully thought out fraud. And the extent of 
misrepresentation doubtless varies depending on which of the 
fraud charges levelled against fractional reserve one is 
considering. 
However, as a second best, let us consider White’s arguments 
as they relate a “fraud” charge against fractional reserve which 
does have some substance, and which is as follows. 
 A fractional reserve bank promises to return to depositors the 
exact sum deposited (maybe plus interest and maybe less bank 
charges). But of course the flaw or fraud there is that the 
money is loaned on or invested by the bank and that involves 
the risk that the loans or investments go bad. And sure as night 
follows day, once every twenty or thirty years the loans do go 
wrong, and one or more large banks can’t repay all the money 
they owe depositors. And as to small banks in the US, they go 
bust at the rate of about one a week. 
So how much fraud or misrepresentation takes place there? 
Well commercial banks certainly do not advertising the fact that 
there is a one in twenty chance that depositors will lose their 
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money! Quite the reverse: their publicity normally stresses the 
safety of the relevant bank. 
Of course the contract governing an account at a typical bank, 
the small print in particular, may say something different. But 
that’s near irrelevant. The typical bank customer does not read 
the small print  - and probably wouldn’t understand it if they did. 
It is thus indisputable that banks are guilty of a certain amount 
of misrepresentation or to put it more strongly – “fraud”. 
31. A 25% or so capital ratio is good enough. 
I.e. a 25% or so ratio brings near total safety, which means 
there is nothing to be gained by going for a 100% ratio, which is 
what FR involves. 
Claimed by Wolf (2012).  Wolf’s exact words were “I accept that 
leverage of 33 to one, as now officially proposed is frighteningly 
high. But I cannot see why the right answer should be no 
leverage at all. An intermediary that can never fail is surely also 
far too safe.” 
Answer. If a very high level of safety COSTS SOMETHING, 
that could well be an argument for sacrificing some safety in 
exchange for reduced costs. But if Wolf thinks such costs exist, 
he needs to tell us what they are. 
The Vickers commission (of which Martin Wolf was a member) 
CLAIMED such costs were involved (see Vickers (2011)). They 
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claimed that total safety would supress bank lending, which in 
turn would supress economic growth. However, any such 
“suppression” can be countered by standard stimulatory 
measures (or the specific stimulatory measures advocated by 
those who argue for FR). 
Next, if the capital ratio is raised to just 25% (or any other non-
100% level) banks will simply bribe and cajole politicians over 
the years into reducing the ratio back down to the 3% or so that 
has obtained over the last decade or so.  In contrast, 100% is a 
clear line in the sand. 
Indeed, George Osborne, Britain’s finance minister, has 
campaigned against ANY IMPROVEMENT WHATEVER in the 
capital ratio. The fact that his political party, the Conservatives, 
is partially funded by banks is of course entirely coincidental. 
(See Wolf (2013)). 
And on the subject of “bribes and cajoling” it should be born in 
mind that the British finance industry spends £93m a year on 
lobbying, according to Mathaison (2012), while in  Europe as a 
whole, there are 1,700 lobbyists working for banks (Corporate 
Europe Observatory (2014)). 
Fractional reserve is in check mate. 
The next problem with a 25% or so ratio is that it’s actually a 
logical inconsistency: put it another way, it leads the existing 
system into check mate, and for the following reasons. 
36 
 
If the ratio is 25%, or even nearer 50% as was common in the 
1800s, and taxpayer funded deposit insurance is left in place, 
then banks are still being subsidised. On the other hand if 
deposit insurance is abandoned, then depositors stand to lose 
if a bank DOES FAIL, and creditors who stand to lose in the 
event of bank failure are effectively a sort of shareholder. Thus 
a 25 to 50% or so ratio minus deposit insurance can be argued 
to amount to a 100% ratio, which is exactly what FR involves! 
Alternatively it could be argued that a 25% or so ratio minus 
deposit insurance turns depositors in to something resembling 
standard trade creditors (as distinct from shareholders). But as 
such, those “trade creditors” have a motive to run in the event 
of trouble (as distinct from shareholders who do not have a 
motive to run). And it was a run on shadow banks that were 
largely behind the recent crisis. So that is a defective solution.  
As Cochrane (2013) argued, the best and cleanest system is to 
simply remove all runnable liabilities from the liability side of 
bank’s balance sheets, i.e. implement the 100% ratio. 
32. A Glass-Steagall or Vickers type split is better 
than an FR type split. 
I.e. splitting the banking industry into a retail half and 
investment half is better than the FR type split: splitting the 
industry into safe accounts and investment accounts.  
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Claimed for example by Vickers (2011) and Pettifor (2014). See 
Pettifor’s paragraph starting “Next, bank’s retail arms-” 
Answer. Vickers sets out three basic reasons for separating 
investment from retail banks on p.9 & 10. Their first reason 
starts “structural separation should make it easier and less 
costly to resolve banks that get into trouble”. Plus Vickers 
claims that ““Investment banks can fail. Retail ones can’t be 
allowed to.” Now that rather conflicts with Vickers’s claim that 
some investment banks (like retail banks) cannot be allowed to 
fail (3.28). 
Indeed, the above first reason goes on to say that each case or 
“failing bank” should be treated differently or treated on its 
merits. But that makes a mockery of the investment / retail split. 
You might as well categorise banks according to which letter of 
the alphabet their names start with and then “treat each case 
on its merits”. 
Their second reason is that the crisis stemmed largely from the 
investment banking sector and that “Separation would guard 
against the risk that these activities (i.e. problems in the 
investment banking sector) might de-stabilise the supply of vital 
retail banking services.”  
Well first, Northern Rock was a retail bank, and it got into 
trouble. And second and as regards those “vital retail banking 
services”, Vickers admits (to repeat) that some investment 
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banks are also “vital”. So Vickers’s distinction between retail 
and investment banks is largely spurious. 
And their third reason claims that “The proposed form of 
separation also gives scope for UK retail banking to have safer 
capital standards than internationally agreed minima..”  
Note Vickers does not claim that their proposals render retail 
banks 100% safe: in other words such banks would still have to 
have taxpayer funded backing, i.e. such banks would still need 
to be subsidised (which of course conflicts with Vickers’s claim 
that taxpayers should not subsidise banks). In contrast, under 
FR, bank accounts which depositors want to be totally safe 
really are totally safe, thus no taxpayer funded backing or 
subsidy of those accounts is needed. 
In short, Vickers’s proposals are a mixture of happy talk and 
self-contradiction, all couched of course, in impeccable English. 
In contrast, under FR, the entities that arise to replace the 
existing banking industry cannot suddenly fail. Thus there is no 
need for bank subsidies. In short, FR achieves the objectives 
that Vickers sets itself, whereas Vickers fails to achieve its own 
objectives. 
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33. Bank shareholders will demand a high return to 
reflect their uncertainty about what a bank actually 
does. 
I.e. bank management knows more about its bank that 
shareholders or potential shareholders, thus the latter will want 
insurance against possibly being misinformed by bank 
management, thus equity is an inherently expensive way of 
funding banks.  
Claimed by Elliot (2013). 
Answer. Depositors and bond-holders who fund banks suffer 
from EXACTLY THE SAME asymmetric information problem. 
Of course depositors are protected from the latter problem by 
deposit insurance and the too big to fail subsidy, but the latter 
two are entirely artificial and unjustified subsidies. (That’s 
where deposit insurance is funded by taxpayers rather than by 
banks themselves, the latter being the case with small US 
banks). 
34. Irresponsible lending under FR would be as 
harmful as under the existing system. 
Answer. There is a big difference between a bank becoming 
INSOLVENT, and its shares declining in value. As the former 
governor of the Bank of England (King (2010)) put it: 
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“And we saw in 1987 and again in the early 2000s, that a sharp 
fall in equity values did not cause the same damage as did the 
banking crisis. Equity markets provide a natural safety valve, 
and when they suffer sharp falls, economic policy can respond. 
But when the banking system failed in September 2008, not 
even massive injections of both liquidity and capital by the state 
could prevent a devastating collapse of confidence and output 
around the world.” 
35. FR reduces commercial bank flexibility. 
 
I.e. under the existing system, an individual bank can lend 
without being too concerned about whether it has enough 
deposits to fund those loans, plus the commercial bank system 
as a whole can expand the total amount it lends without 
reference to government or central bank. And as to those 
amounts loaned out, they of course just become deposits 
somewhere in the commercial bank system. That is, loans 
precede deposits. 
Answer. As to the above first scenario (i.e. an INDIVIDUAL 
bank increasing the amount it lends relative to how fast other 
banks are expanding the amount they lend), that will result in 
the first bank losing reserves to other banks, i.e. becoming 
indebted to other banks. And there is nothing wrong with that if 
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the indebted bank has found particulary worthwhile or viable 
borrowers. 
But under FR, almost exactly the same happens. That is, any 
bank can expand the amount it lends if it can attract funds from 
somewhere: other banks, shareholders, etc. In other words in 
both cases, the bank which is expanding faster than others 
becomes indebted to other entities: the only difference is that 
under FR the latter bank has to line up its creditors BEFORE it 
increases its loans, whereas under the existing system those 
creditors come into existence AFTER the new loans are made. 
 
Aggregate lending. 
As to the second scenario (loans by the commercial bank 
system as a whole expanding) it is hard to see any good 
reason for any significant gyrations in the TOTAL AMOUNT 
that commercial banks lend. In fact it is precisely such gyrations 
which are half the problem. To illustrate, in the three years prior 
to the crunch, commercial bank created money / loans in the 
UK were expanding much faster that normal and much faster 
than the stock of central bank created money (base money). 
And that resulted in a boom followed by a bust. 
Then, as always happens in busts, commercial banks did 
exactly what we do not want them to do, i.e. put the whole 
42 
 
process into reverse: they called in loans, etc. In short, the 
commercial bank system EXACERBATES the boom bust cycle. 
To summarise, when there is a faster than usual expansion in 
the amount of commercial bank lending, that’s probably a sign 
of a boom or bubble. In contrast, if the money supply is under 
the control of the central bank, it can expand the money supply 
in a way desiged to be in the best interests of the country as a 
whole: i.e. in accordance with what inflation and unemployment 
are doing.  
Moreover, opponents of FR (i.e. defenders of the existing 
banking system) are perfectly happy for central banks and 
governments to try and control the boom / bust cycle via 
interest rate adjustments, quantitative easing and so on, and 
the latter necessarily involves influencing the amount of 
commercial bank lending. Those opponents of FR thus need to 
explain why they object so much to commercial bank lending 
being controlled in a slightly different way, as occurs under FR. 
36. FR would not stop bank runs. 
 
I.e. given suspicions about a lending entity, it’s shares would be 
dumped in the same way as depositors withdraw their money 
en masse from a traditional bank about which there are 
suspicions. 
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Answer. Runs on stock exchange quoted shares just do not 
happen. Reason is that given bad news about a firm or 
corporation, the value of its shares drop before anyone has 
time to sell (with the possible exception of some inside traders). 
In contrast, given bad news about a conventional bank, the 
bank tries to pretend that its liabilities are still worth 100 cents 
in the dollar until it finally has to admit they are not, at which 
point it closes its doors. That is, the banks creditors have a 
motive to get their money out before the doors close.  
As Cochrane (2013) put it, “the financial system needs to be 
reformed so that it is not prone to runs. 
37. Vickers demolished the arguments for FR. 
 
Answer. One of the flaws in the arguments put by Vickers 
(2011) were set out in No.2 above. That’s the argument that FR 
involves putting large amounts of money in to safe accounts or 
entities where such money is not loaned on. And that that, on 
the face of it, is a waste of resources. 
Further flaws in Vickers’s arguments are as follows. 
In section 3.20 and 3.21 Vickers deals with what Vickers calls 
“narrow banking”, which is essentially the safe half of the bank 
industry as proposed by FR. And Vickers points out that safe / 
narrow banks are not a source of credit. And the result would 
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be that  “the supply of credit would move entirely to a less 
regulated sector”. 
Answer. The phrase “less regulated” is extremely vague, but if 
it’s supposed to mean that the lending half of the bank industry 
is scarcely regulated at all, then that is totally untrue: under FR, 
lenders have to obey a VERY SPECIFIC set of rules. 
Next, in section 3.22, Vickers makes a whole string of errors, so 
let us run through it sentence by sentence. (Vickers’s actual 
words are in italics below). 
“Limited purpose banking
21
 offers an alternative solution, under 
which the role of financial intermediaries is to bring together 
savers and borrowers but risk is eliminated from the 
intermediary because it does not hold the loan on its books. All 
of the risk of the loan is passed onto the investors in the 
intermediary (or fund), so that effectively all debt is securitised. 
However, limited purpose banking would severely constrain two 
key functions of the financial system. First, it would constrain 
banks’ ability to produce liquidity through the creation of 
liabilities (deposits) with shorter maturities than their assets.” 
Now what’s the word “constrain” doing there? FR does not 
“constrain banks’ ability to produce liquidity”. It totally destroys 
banks’ ability to create money / liquidity: the job of creating 
money / liquidity is handed over to the central bank. 
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As to “securitisation”, FR does not necessarily involve 
securitising the loans that banks or lending entities make 
(though banks would be free to securitise loans if they chose 
to). 
Next, the “21” near the start of the above quote is a reference 
to Kotlikoff’s version of FR, and Kotlikoff (like other advocates 
of FR) does not advocate simply turning the existing banking 
industry into lending entities funded just by shareholders, as 
Vickers suggests. FR (to repeat) involves splitting the industry 
into TWO HALVES, one of which consists of lending entities 
funded just by shareholders, while the other offers totally safe 
transaction accounts.  
Vickers’s next sentence reads: 
“The existence of such deposits allows households and firms to 
settle payments easily.” 
Now amazing as it might seem, FR does not involve the 
destruction of all bank accounts which “allow households and 
firms to settle payments easily”. All FR does is (to repeat) is to 
have the central bank rather than commercial banks create the 
units / money making up those accounts. Plus under FR, 
accounts which are used to “settle payments easily” are 
separated from accounts where relevant sums are loaned on or 
invested. 
Next, Vickers claims: 
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“Second, banks would no longer be incentivised to monitor their 
borrowers, and it would be more difficult to modify loan 
agreements. These activities help to maximise the economic 
value of bank loans.” 
Answer. Where loans really are securitised, then obviously 
“modifying loan agreements” is difficult. But (to repeat) loans 
would not be securitised under FR any more than under the 
existing system. And as to the fact that banks are not 
“incentivised to monitor their borrowers” where loans are 
securitised, that is no more a problem under FR than under the 
existing system. 
 
38. Regulating loans is better than FR. 
 
I.e. an obvious way to make banks safer is to impose more 
stringent regulations on lenders for example insisting on 
minimum equity stakes for mortgagors (i.e. insisting on 
maximum loan to value ratios for mortgagors). 
Answer. The first problem there is that that is relatively easy to 
do in the case of mortgages, but not in the case of loans to 
businesses. For example some bank managers, quite rightly, 
lend to particular businesses because they know the relevant 
business proprietors and know the latter to be competent and 
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trust-worthy. Setting up rules and regulations to cater for those 
elusive characteristics of business proprietors is impossible. 
Second, even if it were possible to forbid the making of risky 
loans, it is hard to see the case for doing so where lender and 
borrower now what they are doing, and assuming there are no 
harmful systemic consequences when a significant proportion 
of those loans go wrong. And the latter is exactly what FR 
achieves because when a significant number of loans go 
wrong, lending entities do not become insolvent: all that 
happens is that shares in lending entities decline in value. 
Moreover, under FR, those who fund loans are free to have 
their money loaned on in whatever way they want: if they really 
want to fund NINJA mortgages, they are free to do so. 
  
Flawed arguments for full reserve. 
39. We pay interest on privately created money. 
I.e. since we seem to pay interest on privately created money 
and not on central bank created money, the latter is better. 
Answer. The above argument is nearly right, but not quite, and 
for the following reasons. 
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A private or commercial bank creates money when it grants a 
loan, or so it might seem: for example when you apply for and 
get a loan for £X, the bank can create that £X out of thin air, 
and you pay interest on your loan. 
The reality however is that you pay ADMINISTRATION COSTS 
to the bank, and as to interest, that is a charge made by those 
who deposit money at the bank. To illustrate that point, 
consider the following hypothetical scenario. 
Assume a private bank sets up in a barter economy, and offers 
some wondrous new stuff called “money” which disposes of the 
inefficiencies of barter. 
Citizens open accounts and offer collateral so as to enable their 
accounts to be credited. And let’s assume initially that citizens 
only want enough money for day to day transactions: i.e. no 
long term loans are involved. 
Now clearly the bank will charge for administration costs (e.g. 
checking up on the value of collateral). But there is no reason 
for the bank to charge interest. 
Interest is a charge made by a lender for the pain or 
inconvenience of foregoing consumption (i.e. saving) so that 
the borrower CAN CONSUME, or “spend”. And in creating 
money out of thin air in our hypothetical economy, the bank has 
not foregone consumption, and nor has anyone else, so there 
is no reason to charge interest. 
49 
 
But of course that’s not to say that if you get a loan just to give 
you enough for day to day transactions from a bank that you 
won’t be charged what the bank CALLS interest. The point is 
that if the bank does its costings properly (i.e. does not 
subsidise one type of customer paid for by excess charges on 
other customers) then the bank won’t charge you REAL 
INTEREST. 
Money creation involves debt creation? 
Note also, that where a commercial bank creates just 
transaction money, no real debt is created. To be more exact, a 
couple of equal and opposite debts are created (plus a third 
debt if collateral is deposited). That is, when a bank customer 
induces a bank to credit $Y to the customer’s account, that $Y 
is a debt owed by the bank which the customer can transfer to 
others (e.g. using a cheque book, debit card, etc). The bank 
then owes a sum of money to “others”. But at the same time, 
the customer, as part of the agreement with their bank 
undertakes to repay the $Y to the bank at some stage. So there 
are two equal and opposite debts there. 
Moreover, if the customer deposits collateral at the bank, then 
the bank owes that to the customer when the $Y is eventually 
repaid. So, far from money creation by commercial banks 
involving customers becoming indebted to a bank, often as not 
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it’s the other way round if anything: the bank owes the 
customer more than the customer owes the bank. 
Long term loans. 
Where money is created just for day to day transactions, no 
long term loan is involved: the amount in each citizen’s bank 
account would bob up and down from one week to the next, but 
that’s it. 
In contrast, there are long term loans. Borrowers don’t get 
loans just to sit a home admiring their newly acquired pile of 
money: they get loans in order to spend, i.e. consume the fruits 
of other peoples’ labour. 
Now the only way to induce anyone to abstain from 
consumption is for the bank to offer interest to depositors. If 
interest is offered, then some people will leave more in their 
bank accounts than they otherwise would. And clearly the bank 
will have to pass that interest on to borrowers. 
In short the bank will not charge interest simply for creating 
money. But it WILL CHARGE long term borrowers interest, 
because for every long term loan, there has to be someone 
making a long term deposit (or a series of people making 
longish term deposits).  
Of course banks do a certain amount of what’s called “maturity 
transformation”, that is funding long term loans from a series of 
short term deposits. But that does not alter the point that for 
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every long term loan made, there must be depositors leaving 
unused money in the bank (some for long periods and some for 
shorter periods).  
Conclusion: the above argument is valid in that it is correct to 
say that privately created money is inherently more expensive 
to create than central bank money because of the 
administration costs involved in privately created money. But it 
is not true to say that we pay interest in respect of money 
created by commercial banks. 
40. FR benefits the environment and equality.  
Claimed by Dyson (2013). 
Answer. One can subsidise windfarms (or not) under fractional 
reserve, and ditto for full reserve. Plus tax in CO2 emitting fuels 
can be raised (or not) under both full and fractional reserve. 
Thus the environment has little to do with the full versus 
fractional reserve argument. 
It is also hard to see why the PATTERN of consumption would 
change much give a switch to FR. That is, the proportion of 
family budgets spent on cars, food, housing, clothes would not 
change much. Thus there are no obvious environmental 
effects. 
As for inequalities, same applies. FR ought to ameliorate the 
boom / bust cycle a bit, which in turn would reduce the periods 
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of high unemployment that come after the bust. And that clearly 
reduces inequalities SOMEWHAT. But it is hard to see why 
equality is an issue that is closely related to the full versus 
fractional reserve argument. 
41. Without debt there would be no money. 
I.e. Commercial banks create money when they lend, thus 
without debt there would be no money.  
Claimed by Rowbotham (1998). 
Answer. The answer to that point is spelled out essentially in 
No.35 above. That is, when a commercial bank creates money, 
no long term debt is involved. While in contrast, when a 
commercial bank grants a long term loan, it can well be argued 
that no money creation is involved. See No.35 above. 
42. Interest condemns borrowers to perpetual debt. 
I.e. the money which commercial banks lend does not supply 
borrowers with the money to pay interest to said banks, thus 
borrowers are condemned to permanently increasing or never 
ending debt.  
Claimed by Rowbotham (1998). 
Answer. The answer to the above point is very simple. It is that 
interest paid to banks is subsequently returned to households 
in numerous forms: 1, interest payments by banks to 
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depositors, 2, dividend payments to bank shareholders, 3, 
payments to bank staff and a large range of other 
administrative costs that banks have to pay, like upkeep of 
offices and buying computers. 
Of course the latter paragraph blurs the distinction between 
interest and administration costs somewhat. That distinction is 
spelled out more clearly in item No.35 above. 
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